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CHRISTIANS AND PAGANS*
ABNER S. GREENE†
In his provocative and engaging Pagans and Christians in
the City,1 Steven Smith argues that ancient Roman persecution
of Christians raises a puzzle—why did the persecution exist?
What was the harm the Christians were causing?2 Smith says
this question persists, in different form, in today’s America—why
are Christians persecuted here? What harm are they causing?3
Smith’s answer is something like this—we can see a political
(sometimes more) battle between two conceptions of God: the
pagan conception of God as immanent in the world and the
Christian conception of God as transcendent.4 Then, as now,
when the pagans are in power they fear the Christians (for
reasons that are sometimes clear, sometimes less so) and use
their political power in various ways to subjugate Christians.
In this response paper, I will offer four thoughts. First, I’m
not sure the contemporary picture is best described as pagans vs.
Christians. Second, I question the subtle move throughout the
book from a generative/creative understanding of God to seeing
God as normative, as supervening in human affairs regarding
right and wrong conduct. Third, I push back on the notion that
theistic belief (or, perhaps, the very existence of God) is
necessary to ground meaning and value. Fourth, I discuss some
modern-day U.S. constitutional issues that Smith discusses as
examples of pagans persecuting Christians: (a) state-sponsored
religious symbols, (b) religious arguments in the lawmaking
process, and (c) the application of public accommodation antidiscrimination laws to religiously devout persons.

I refer to the Dar Williams classic song by this title. See DAR WILLIAMS,
CHRISTIANS AND PAGANS, (Razor & Tie 1996).
†
Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Steve Smith
and the St. John’s Law School conference organizers for a terrific opportunity to
meet and discuss Steve’s book.
1
STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM
THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018) [hereinafter PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS].
2
Id. at 3, 5.
3
Id. at 7.
4
Id. at 33, 111–12, 114–15, 212–13, 278, 280–82, 291, 299, 303, 316, 332–33,
335, 351.
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First. Smith contrasts a purely secular, scientific approach
with (as Smith puts it) a pagan approach—a claim to share the
sublime/wonder/awe response with Christians, but a view of God
(or gods) as immanent in humanity and the natural world, rather
than transcendent.5 Much of Smith’s argument depends on his
claim that ACLU-type contemporary liberal litigators are really
advancing a pagan agenda. It’s never clear where this conclusion
comes from. The arguments advanced in litigation against statesponsored religious symbols, against laws based on predominant,
express, religious justifications, and for the application of public
accommodation anti-discrimination laws to businesses serving
the general public, neither make reference to nor turn implicitly
on a pagan immanent conception of God.6 That many liberals
who share these litigation positions also share (with Christians)
a sense of the sublime/wonder/awe—and maybe therefore share
more of a belief in God than they would care to admit—does not
mean that these litigation positions are based in pagan-theisticimmanence.7
Second. Smith’s set-up is based in different conceptions of
the generative/creative God, and is to some extent about ontology
and nothing more. God exists . . . in a transcendent way, or in an
immanent way. This is a fascinating and important issue, and
my own open-ended agnosticism on the God question is in part a
life-long struggle with this debate.
But it’s one thing to
claim/attempt to show that God is transcendent (and perhaps

5

See generally id. at ch. 9.
Regarding state-sponsored religious symbols, Smith interprets permitting
state speech such as flying the U.S. flag versus not permitting state speech such as a
crèche atop a county courthouse staircase as a triumph of immanent over
transcendent religiosity. Id. at 278, 280. Smith runs a similar argument regarding
types of religious argument he claims are permitted and not permitted in the
lawmaking process. Id. at 281–82, 334–39. And he suggests something similar is
happening in the conflict between public accommodation anti-discrimination laws
and small business owners who oppose same-sex marriage. Id. at 342–43.
7
Smith says that apprehension of the sublime/wonder/awe is evidence of God’s
existence. Id. at 32, 34, 36. (It isn’t clear from these pages whether Smith is merely
describing a certain religious perspective or, in addition, supporting this position.)
This seems wrong to me. I was lucky enough as a student at Michigan Law School to
take a course with the excellent legal theorist Philip Soper, who let me write a paper
called “Sitting Still: An Ontology.” The key claim in that paper is that in all humans
there is a tension between what I called the “classical” and the “modern,” i.e.,
between a yearning for what is beyond comprehension, for the infinite/eternity, and
what is palpable, here and now. That the classical yearning is part of what it means
to be human should not lead us to conclude that that for which we yearn exists.
Maybe it does, maybe it doesn’t.
6
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even the more specific Christian theology on this, which as Smith
notes complicates transcendence8), and another thing to say or
suggest that the transcendent God has normative powers over
humanity, supervenes in human affairs, is the basis of
conceptions of right and wrong conduct, etc.9 The move is
important for Smith because the struggles between the
Christians and the pagans with which Smith is ultimately
concerned aren’t just struggles over who’s right regarding the
generative/creative issue, but also are (of most importance to
Smith) struggles over conceptions of right and wrong, i.e., they
are normative. I’d like to think it’s possible to believe that “God
had condescended to become incarnate in the man Jesus, that
Jesus was born of a virgin, [and] that after his crucifixion he was
resurrected”10 without necessarily believing in the authority of
biblical injunctions purporting to stem from Jesus.11
Third. Smith states the oft-heard claim that morality cannot
exist without God.12 Moral objectivism is a well-established
position, though, taken by many who do not ground what they
claim to be objective moral truths in God’s existence or her
dictates. I bridle at the position that morality cannot exist
without God. It implies either that those of us who aren’t theists
are amoral or that we’re mistakenly living in a kind of fog and
hopefully someday we’ll see the light. I would hope that theists
could be agnostic on this question, open to morality grounded not
in God, even as they believe it is.
Fourth. Are Christians being persecuted in today’s America?
(a) When a court orders a crèche off the staircase of a county
courthouse, are Christians being persecuted?13 Forget for the
moment about the complexities of Establishment Clause doctrine
and whether there’s a good judicially administrable test here. (I
think Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test gets it about right,
although not quite for O’Connor’s reasons.14) Why isn’t it enough
8

Id. at 112.
Id. at 41, 42, 122, 147, 253, 371.
10
Id. at 181.
11
I apologize for stepping into a vast ages-old debate. But this seemed a good
time to raise some of these thoughts.
12
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 190, 228, 369 (the first cite is
arguably just reporting a position taken by others; not so the other two cites).
13
See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989);
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 278, 280.
14
Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 1475, 1485, 1513–25 (2018) (arguing that the state does not properly speak
in the name of its citizens when it erects sectarian religious symbols). For
9
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to put the crèche up on the front lawn of your home or church? I
appreciate that in McCreary County v. ACLU, Justice Scalia
wrote (in dissent) of “the interest of the overwhelming majority of
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and
supplication as a people”15 (by which he clearly means via state
action). That interest, however, is illegitimate, unless it makes
sense to say that the government may make religious
proclamations on behalf of the truth claims of a favored religion
or religious sect. Is that what devout religious persons want?
Aren’t their religious beliefs stronger when these proclamations
are not made by Caesar?16
(b) Smith suggests that there is a norm afoot preventing
religious folk from advancing their religious arguments in
politics.17 But we hear religious arguments in politics all the
time, and we should be fine with that. This practice doesn’t
violate the Establishment Clause.
What violates the
Establishment Clause is for law to be based on an express,
predominant, religious justification.18 I argued that years ago19
and still think it’s right. Whether one buys my argument—that
in these instances (and these alone) nonreligious folk are
improperly excluded from the political process—or any cognate
argument about why capture of the lawmaking process by a
religious sect for its openly sectarian ends is improper in our
constitutional order, this still leaves lots of room for religion in

O’Connor’s test, see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
773, 779–80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
15
545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
16
I write as the U.S. Supreme Court is considering its latest state-sponsored
religious symbol case—a large Latin (Christian) cross (as war memorial) at a public
road intersection in Maryland. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n (U.S. No. 171717) (consolidated with Maryland-Nat’l Capital and Planning Comm’n v. Am.
Humanist Ass’n (U.S. No. 18-18)). This should be an easy case for invalidation—the
cross is clearly religious and sectarian and its role as a war memorial is because of
the connection to Christian views about death and resurrection and eternal life.
17
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 334–39, 353–54.
18
See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 861, 863; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
585–94 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 107–08 (1968).
19
Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611, 1614–33 (1993). See also ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE
MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 150–55 (2012).
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politics, and indeed leaves room for almost any end a religious
person wants so long as she can translate the core express
arguments into secular terms.
(c) Finally, consider Charlie Craig and David Mullins
wanting a custom-made cake for their same-sex marriage
celebration and Jack Phillips’ religiously based need to not make
such a cake.20 I find this sort of case quite difficult (and am
working on expanding a lecture called The Dilemma of Liberal
Pluralism21 to deal with these and related matters). But is
application of public accommodation anti-discrimination law
really persecution of Christians? This is not state action targeted
at a religious sect. It is a law of general applicability that has a
disparate impact on some persons/businesses. I share the view
that Employment Division v. Smith22 should be overruled and
that courts should apply elevated scrutiny of some kind to cases
such as this; I don’t doubt for a minute the harm to people such
as Phillips.23 But whether we should see this as a cost of doing
business, and vote for Craig and Mullins, or as an inappropriate
burden on a religious small-business owner, and vote for Phillips,
the fact that these cases are so close, and reasonable minds can
differ, and a reasonable mind (mine!) can be torn (supporting
both same-sex marriage and religious accommodation), suggests
that we might do better by turning down the heat and not seeing
this kind of case as a kind of pagan persecution of Christians.

20
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1723–24, 1729, 1732 (2018) (deciding the case on as-applied Free Exercise Clause
grounds; holding that the state discriminated against Phillips’ religious beliefs);
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 340–43. In the text I focus on a core
underlying aspect of cases such as this—a claim of harm from, and thus need for
religious exemption from, a nondiscriminatory law of general applicability—rather
than on the facts that led the Court to decide the case in favor of Phillips.
21
Abner S. Greene, The Dilemma of Liberal Pluralism, lecture delivered to the
McGill University Research Group on Constitutional Studies (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0sdoU4n3eU.
22
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (applying rational basis test only to law of general
applicability that incidentally burdens religious exercise).
23
For further thoughts on Masterpiece Cakeshop, see Abner S. Greene, Barnette
and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667 (2019).

